Trump 2.0 Middle East policy not an Israeli honeymoon

• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the US this week – and potential bilateral meetings with both presidential contenders Kamala Harris and Donald Trump – is a good opportunity to highlight four points regarding how a Trump 2.0 presidency might approach the Middle East region:

• 1) Trump and Netanyahu do not have a bromance:
  • While it is often noted that Trump was irked by Netanyahu refusing to take his side regarding the 2020 election’s results, their tiffs predated that episode, and instead began with Trump’s frustration at Netanyahu’s lack of cooperation during Jared Kushner’s attempt at striking an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal:
    • “Trump became frustrated and didn't hide it from Netanyahu. 'Bibi, I think you are the problem,' he said” (Source)

• 2) Trump is not likely to be supportive of any extension or expansion of Israel’s war(s):
  • “we gotta get to peace, we can't have this going on. […] Israel has to be very careful, because you're losing a lot of the world, you're losing a lot of support, you have to finish up” (Source)

• 3) On Iran, Trump is more likely to follow Saudi Arabia’s lead than Israel’s:
  • In his first term, “Trump was furious at Netanyahu and said that Israel was willing to fight Iran down to the last American soldier” (Source)
    • Meanwhile, “[a]lthough […] Saudi Arabia, and the UAE strongly backed Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against the Islamic Republic during his previous term in office (2017-21), Gulf Arab states would probably not support such a posture under a second Trump presidency” – eager as they will be to preserve the tentative détente reached with Tehran since March 2023 (Source)
    • Instead, “Saudi Arabia could use ties with both Iran and the U.S. to urge them to start talks about a broader agreement that would seek to contain Iran’s regional power projection along with the nuclear program in exchange for […] allowing Saudi investment in specific segments of the Iranian economy” (Source) – thereby addressing one of Tehran’s main sources of frustration to date in its détente with Riyadh.
  • And indeed, recent comments by former President Trump suggest such a prospect may not be so anathema to him:
    • “The main thing is: Iran can't have a nuclear weapon. That was my main thing…It cannot have that nuclear capability. Other than that, we talk about everything” (Source)

• 4) Trump would love to oversee Saudi-Israeli normalization, but there may be hiccups:
  • “The campaign staff of former President Donald Trump […] would like the focus to be on a Trump peace plan for Saudi normalization, furthering the 2020 peace agreement between Israel, Bahrain, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates” (Source)
  • But:
    • 1) His isolationist tendencies mean he may not be eager to offer up the same bilateral defense guarantees the Biden administration has been touting to:
      • Saudi Arabia: Hence why “[t]he diplomatic push by Riyadh [to wrap up a defense deal before the US presidential election] is driven by a desire to nail down a deal while the U.S. Democrats are still in the White House” (Source)
      • Israel: “Negotiations are set to begin next year ahead of the 2026 deadline for the 10-year Memorandum of Understanding between the nations. Trump, who views foreign aid as transactional, might refuse to consider an increase in the annual $3.8 billion in U.S. assistance” (Source)
    • 2) His polarizing political style may make it less likely Democratic Senators are willing to cross the aisle to support him in the event Senate ratification is needed:
      • “the Saudis probably believe[d] it w[ould] be easier for them to achieve [an Israeli normalization deal] with Biden, than with an even more divided and divisive Congress, in the scenario where Trump wins the election this November” (Source)